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If a reputation is injured, does it matter whether defamation is
the cause? Injury to reputation differs from other items of damage
a plaintiff enumerates. Tradition links it to particular tortious con-
duct-defamation-on the part of a defendant.1 This Comment ex-
amines ordinary negligent conduct as an alternative ground for re-
covery for injury to reputation.
Recently, a number of plaintiffs have tried to recover for in-
jury to their reputations from tortious conduct that is not defama-
tory. Typically, an accident injures a plaintiff's reputation when
the plaintiff did not cause the accident but it looks like the plain-
tiff's fault. If a court finds that a defendant behaved negligently,
the court must then decide whether to allow recovery for the re-
sulting injury to a reputation given that the defendant's conduct
was not defamatory.
Taken as a whole, the claim of these plaintiffs is that injury to
reputation is conceptually distinct from defamatory conduct and
the highly-developed tort of defamation. This Comment describes
the approaches courts have taken to negligence claims for injury to
reputation. It then proposes a test for courts faced with an attempt
to recover reputational damage claims brought on a negligence
theory.2
Some courts have held that all claims for harm to reputation
necessarily sound in defamation. Other courts have rejected the
idea that defamation preempts all other grounds for recovery.
These courts differ in their estimation of when reputation damages
are recoverable outside of the tort of defamation. Section I pro-
vides an overview of the relevant defamation doctrine. Section II
t B.A. 1985, Amherst College; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
A few intentional torts closely related to defamation, such as malicious prosecution
and malicious arrest, can also lead to recovery for injury to reputation.
2 For an examination of reputational damages resulting from breach of contract, see
Note, Recovery in Contract for Damage to Reputation: Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., 63 St John's L Rev 110 (1988).
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introduces the recent cases. Section III argues that defamation
should be the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs who allege reputa-
tional injury where a communication is present. Section IV con-
cludes that negligence actions not preempted by defamation
should be allowed if both the specific plaintiff and the specific
harm were foreseeable to the defendant.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DEFAMATION LAW
This Section offers an examination of the relevant defamation
doctrine. Because defamation is rooted in the common law rather
than in statutes, its definition is imprecise. It is a somewhat con-
fused and illogical field,3 and appealing to the principles underly-
ing it provides only partial guidance for these new cases.
A. Original Ideas About Reputation
In the status society of England during the Middle Ages in
which defamation law developed, an assault on a person's reputa-
tion was considered an assault on the entire community.4 It af-
fronted important status relationships and threatened positions
held by everyone. The legal sanction was aimed at the conduct of
the defendant who had transgressed the system.5 Although the
plaintiff could seek to vindicate his personal reputation, the stakes
for society were equally important.
In the transition to a market economy, the common under-
standing of the interest in reputation changed from honor and sta-
tus to property. Reputation in a market world is an asset devel-
oped by the individual, and susceptible to damage like other
personal property.6 Changes in defamation doctrine have reflected
this shift.7 The present attempt to sever reputation from tradi-
I See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
Colum L Rev 546, 547-48 (1903); Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts 242-43 (Stevens and
Sons, 13th ed 1929); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputa-
tion and the Constitution, 74 Cal L Rev 691, 691 (1986); W. Page Keeton, et al, eds, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111 at 771 (West, 5th ed 1984); James C. Courtney,
Absurdities of the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 Am L Rev 552, 553 (1902).
" Post, 74 Cal L Rev at 699-707 (cited in note 3); Robert C. Post, The Social Founda-
tions of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal L Rev 957, 962-63
(1989).
1 Post, 74 Cal L Rev at 702-03 (cited in note 3); Peter Meijas Tiersma, The Language
of Defamation, 66 Tex L Rev 303, 314 (1987).
' See Post, 74 Cal L Rev at 693-99 (cited in note 3).
For example, the dropping of the actual malice requirement and the development of
strict liability both reflect a shift in focus from the defendant's culpable conduct to the
plaintiff's injury.
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tional causes of action follows naturally the shift from the commu-
nity condemnation of conduct disruptive of status to an individual
property interest in reputation. Although history cannot resolve
the current doctrinal questions, it is the backdrop against which
these cases are brought.
B. Current Defamation Doctrine
According to the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts,
four elements must be present to create liability for defamation:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an
unprivileged communication to a third party;' (c) fault amounting
at least to negligence; and (d) certain types of harm.9 The commu-
nication element plays a key role in the negligence cases. The note
accompanying the Restatement says "communication is used to
denote the fact that one person has brought an idea to the percep-
tion of another."' 10
C. Defamation May Be an Incomplete Remedy
As noted above, communication is a required element of a def-
amation action. Sometimes, however, a defendant's negligent con-
duct does not itself constitute the communication of an idea, yet
that conduct may still injure the plaintiff's reputation. In this re-
spect, defamation is an inadequate remedy for some plaintiffs.
Some of the cases examined below lack the communication el-
ement of defamation entirely.11 Other cases have a communication
element, but the plaintiff chooses to focus on an aspect of the de-
fendant's conduct that is not communicative. 2 Plaintiffs usually
make this choice for strategic reasons, such as avoiding a statute of
limitations on defamation actions.
' Courts have never imposed strict liability for accidental and non-negligent communi-
cation of defamatory matter. See Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at § 113 (cited in
note 3).
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (American Law Institute, 1977). More precisely,
the full text of the Restatement describing the harm states the fourth element as "(d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication."
"0 Id at § 559, comment (a).
" In a trivial sense, an idea must always be communicated to injure a reputation, since
a reputation is a relational interest. See text accompanying note 66. But for purposes of
defamation law, "communication" should be understood as intentional communication by
the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant intended the communication to be
injurious.
" See text accompanying notes 42-45.
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Recovery for different types of damages has proliferated in
modern tort law.1" Since most jurisdictions now allow recovery for
damage to reputation from a few other intentional torts, 4 the his-
torical limitation to defamation is inconclusive. A small number of
recent cases in different jurisdictions have also allowed recovery
for damage to reputation in ordinary negligence. These cases, as
discussed below, signal a judicial recognition that defamation is an
incomplete remedy for injury to reputation.
II. THE RECENT CASES UNDER THE NEGLIGENCE ALTERNATIVE
Several recent cases have addressed the issue of reputational
damages in an ordinary negligence action. The courts concentrate
on slightly different questions and concerns in reaching their dif-
fering conclusions.
Below, this Comment describes the cases brought to recover
reputational damages on an ordinary negligence theory. It catego-
rizes them by the line of analysis pursued by the court. The cases
focus on whether defamation is the exclusive remedy for damages
to reputation. Three categories of cases emerge: courts that argue
that defamation and injury to reputation are by definition not sev-
erable; those that argue that injury to reputation is recoverable
only for intentional torts; and those that analyze the presence of a
communication as determining whether defamation preempts the
field. None analyze whether negligence is an appropriate alterna-
tive theory.
A. Defamation as the Only Game in Town
Two courts have taken the approach that any claim for dam-
age to reputation is necessarily a defamation action. These courts
define defamation exclusively by the injury element, not in combi-
nation with the communication element.
In Morrison v Nat'l Broadcasting Co.,'5 the defendant televi-
sion producer induced the plaintiff university professor to partici-
pate in a game show. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the producer
had rigged the game. The plaintiff argued that when the public
learned of the hoax, all participants in the game suffered damage
13 See Quinones v United States, 492 F2d 1269, 1278-79 (3d Cir 1974).
" The Ross and Morrison courts limited the possibilities for recovery to defamation
without mention of other related intentional torts. They may have believed those torts were
a part of defamation law; the Restatement does not resolve that question explicitly. See note
54.
,5 19 NY2d 453, 227 NE2d 572, 574 (1967).
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to their reputations because the public could not distinguish be-
tween those who had participated in the hoax and those who had
not. The court dismissed the professor's complaint. In the court's
view, any claim for injury to reputation was a defamation claim,
and here the statute of limitations on defamation had run. The
court acknowledged that it was unusual to tie an item of damage to
one sort of conduct: "unlike most torts, defamation is defined in
terms of the injury, damage to reputation, and not in terms of the
manner in which the injury is accomplished."' 6
The court in Ross v Gallant, Farrow & Co." similarly held
that reputation claims necessarily sound in defamation. The de-
fendant, an accounting firm, prepared an audit report that injured
the reputation of a union local's business manager by raising the
question of improper use of funds by the union official. The busi-
ness manager sued the firm for negligently performing its investi-
gation and preparing its report. The court rejected the negligence
claim because it considered defamation to be the sole remedy for
injury to reputation' 8 and rejected the defamation claim because
accounting firms have a qualified privilege from defamation. 9 This
case looked more like defamation than Morrison because there was
a communication and publication (in the form of the report itself).
Thus the court did not face the difficult scenario of a reputational
injury claim without the presence of the traditional elements of
defamation.
Other courts disagree with these two, holding that, for the
purposes of preempting other causes of action, defamation is a par-
ticular combination of injury to reputation and the communication
of an idea. 0
B. Recovery for Intentional Torts Only
Other courts have recognized that plaintiffs may recover for
damage to reputation in actions apart from defamation. Two of
those, however, did not allow recovery in a negligence action be-
cause in their view damage to reputation is recoverable only for
intentional torts.
16 Id.
17 27 Ariz App 89, 551 P2d 79 (1976).
18 551 P2d at 82.
19 Id at 81.
10 See, for example, Jorgensen v Massachusetts Port Authority, 905 F2d 515, 519-20
(1st Cir 1990); Bulkin v Western Kraft East, Inc., 422 F Supp 437, 443 (E D Pa 1976). See
text at notes 37-40, 45.
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In Hamilton v Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy21 a client
sued a law firm after being prosecuted and acquitted as a result of
following bad advice the firm gave regarding some securities. The
client filed a malpractice action based on negligence and breach of
duty, alleging that the bad advice leading to the prosecution had
caused humiliation, injury to his reputation, and a decreased ca-
pacity to earn money.22 He did not, however, allege fraud or inten-
tional wrongdoing. The court held that claims for injury to reputa-
tion "are recoverable only in actions alleging intentional or wanton
misconduct, for example, libel and slander, malicious prosecution
or malicious arrest. ' '23 The court focused on its view of the intent
requirement in defamation doctrine in rejecting the plaintiff's
claim.
Similarly, in Greives v Greenwood,24 the court rejected a negli-
gence claim for injury to reputation because the tort was not inten-
tional. The plaintiff alleged injury to his reputation as a cattle
raiser when the defendant veterinarian negligently inoculated his
cattle with a fatal virus. To the Hamilton list of intentional torts
for which reputational damages are recoverable, the court added
abuse of process and third party contract interference. "These in-
tentional torts afford this remedy because the result is foreseeable.
Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to ex-
pect, not merely what might conceivably occur."2 5 Neither of these
two cases discusses why injury to reputation could not be consid-
ered a foreseeable result of particular negligent acts.
C. Cases Allowing Negligence Claims Without Analysis
In a number of cases, courts have assumed, without analysis,
that injury to reputation is a recoverable item of damage from neg-
ligent conduct. These courts take the traditional tort law view that
a defendant is responsible for the foreseeable consequences of her
negligent conduct, including any foreseeable harms to persons'
reputations.
In Kennedy v McKesson,26 the plaintiff dentist arranged for
the defendant repair company to repair his anesthetic machine.
The defendant negligently mislabelled dispensers so that nitrous
21 167 Ga App 411, 306 SE2d 340 (1983), aft'd, 252 Ga 149, 311 SE2d 818 (1984).
22 306 SE2d at 340.
23 Id.
24 550 NE2d 334 (Ind App 1990).
25 Id at 338 (citations omitted).
28 58 NY2d 500, 448 NE2d 1332 (1983).
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oxide flowed from a tube marked "oxygen." The dentist, intending
to administer oxygen to a patient, administered nitrous oxide in-
stead, killing the patient. The dentist sued to recover for damage
to his reputation caused by the defendant's negligence. The court
allowed recovery without discussing the plaintiff's failure to bring a
defamation action.
In Oksenholt v Lederle Laboratories,2 7 the court allowed an
action in negligence against a drug manufacturer for injury to a
physician's reputation after a patient became blind as a result of
taking a drug the physician had prescribed. The court did not ask
whether damage to reputation is recoverable only for intentional
torts. Instead, the court noted that federal regulations require drug
manufacturers to warn of the contraindications of their products,
and that the defendant had failed to do so. 28 The court held that
under state law foreseeability is assumed where the defendant vio-
lates safety regulations.29
D. Analysis of the Communication Element
Communication is indisputably a required element of a defa-
mation action. Many courts properly focus their attention on that
communication requirement: if a communication is present, those
courts limit plaintiffs to defamation actions.30 Conversely, these
courts hold that where there is no communication, a complaint al-
leging damage to reputation is not constrained by the requirements
of a defamation cause of action.3 1 As noted below, these courts dis-
agree about the proper definition of "communication." In addition,
some courts allow recovery in negligence where a communication is
present, as long as the complaint addresses negligent conduct other
than the communication.
1. The definition of communication.
Courts that allow a negligence claim only in the absence of a
communication disagree about what constitutes "communication."
For example, the court in Jimenez-Nieves v United States, recog-
nized that for defamation to preempt the field the complaint needs
more than just damage to reputation-a communication is also
21 294 Or 213, 656 P2d 293 (1982).
2'8 656 P2d at 296.
21 Id at 297.
3o Jimenez-Nieves v United States, 682 F2d 1, 1 (1st Cir 1982); Jorgensen, 905 F2d at
519-20.
31 Jorgensen, 905 F2d at 515; Quinones, 492 F2d at 1278-79.
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necessary." The court then said that a communication can be pre-
sent though it is implicit rather than explicit.
In Jimenez-Nieves, the Social Security Administration made a
keypuncher's typographical error in a file, stating that the plain-
tiff's mother had died a year later than she had. As a result, the
SSA told the plaintiff's financial institutions that it was dishonor-
ing his checks.3 3 The plaintiff alleged that the keypuncher's negli-
gent act of entering incorrect data injured his reputation. The out-
come of the case turned on whether a communication had
occurred. If the SSA communicated a defamatory statement, then
the plaintiff's claim would fail because, as a branch of the federal
government, the SSA was exempt from defamation actions under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 4
The court turned to the Restatement's definition of communi-
cation. The Restatement interprets "communication" to "denote
the fact that one person has brought an idea to the perception of
another."35 The court held that dishonoring the checks implicitly
communicated defamatory statements to the plaintiff's bank, em-
ployer, and other institutions. The court explained that the claim
"resound[s] in the heartland of the tort of defamation: the injury is
to reputation; the conduct is the communication of an idea, either
implicitly or explicitly."36 Because the court found a communica-
tion, it rejected the plaintiff's negligence claim.
In Jorgensen v Massachusetts Port Authority, the Court took
a different approach to analyzing the presence of a "communica-
tion" by emphasizing that the defendants themselves must asser-
tively communicate the idea.37 In that case, airline pilots whose
plane skidded on the runway brought an action against the airport
operator, alleging that the operator's negligence in allowing ice to
accumulate on the runway caused damage to the pilots' reputa-
tions as safe pilots.3 8 The ground crew's negligence had already
been established. The only issue remaining was whether the air-
port should compensate the pilots for their inability to find work
after the accident as a result of harm done to their reputations.
The court recognized that recovery for damage to reputation
in an ordinary negligence case may be possible, because the ab-
32 682 F2d at 1.
33 Id at 2.
34 28 USC §§ 1346(b), 2680 (1988). See text accompanying notes 64-65.
11 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, comment a (cited in note 9).
3 Jimenez-Nieves, 682 F2d at 6 (citations omitted).
11 905 F2d at 519-20.
3" Id at 517.
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sence of a communication takes an injury to reputation out of the
field of defamation. The court distinguished Jimenez-Nieves by
arguing that in that case, the defendant had implicitly communi-
cated something; here, however, there was not even implicit com-
munication." Rather, the court held, the defendant caused an acci-
dent and it was the accident, rather than the defendant, that
communicated the harmful message.40 Since no conduct of the de-
fendant's resembled even implicit communication, the negligence
claim was possible.
2. Claims allowed despite a communication.
Some courts allow negligence claims to survive in spite of a
communication if the complaint addresses other, noncommunica-
tive negligent conduct by the defendant. Often, this allows plain-
tiffs to circumvent special requirements of a defamation action,
such as a statute of limitations, or exemption under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. In Quinones v United States, the Third Circuit
held that Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action in negli-
gence for damage to reputation.4' The plaintiff, a former federal
employee, alleged that the federal government failed to use due
care in maintaining his personnel records, resulting in damage to
his reputation.4" The federal administrative regulations governing
maintenance of personnel records contemplated dissemination of
information to prospective employers and warned of a risk of in-
jury to an employee's reputation.43 The court held that a duty
arose to use reasonable care in maintaining the accuracy of the
records because the risk of injury was contemplated. According to
the court, a claim arising from the breach of this duty is cognizable
as an ordinary tort action outside of defamation, although a claim
based on breach of the duty to disseminate accurate information is
barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act as defamation.44 In
other words, the decision turned on whether the plaintiff had fo-
cused on the communication in framing the complaint, or on the
negligent recordkeeping itself.
30 Id at 521.
40 Of course, the harm to reputation actually arises from people's interpretation of the
accident.
41 492 F2d at 1276-79.
42 Id at 1272.
43 Id at 1276-77.
44 Id at 1277-78, 1281.
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The district court in Bulkin v Western Kraft East, Inc., fol-
lowed the court in Quinones in holding that a claim of negligent
recordkeeping is different from a claim focusing on the communi-
cation of the resulting defamatory matter.45 The court likewise al-
lowed a plaintiff alleging negligent record-keeping to recover be-
cause of the way he characterized the complaint.
III. RESOLVING THE COURTS' CONCERNS
The first question raised by the cases, and in many cases the
only question, is whether the cause of action brought in ordinary
negligence is actually a cause of action in defamation that has been
mischaracterized. Courts focus most of their attention on the defi-
nition of defamation. Even if a court believes the claim is not a
mischaracterized cause of action in defamation, this Comment sug-
gests it should still struggle with a second question: whether to al-
low recovery in ordinary negligence for damage to reputation. Sur-
prisingly, most courts have not concerned themselves with this
question. This section proposes resolutions to the issues the courts
do address. The next section discusses the question the courts do
not address-the proper negligence standard.
This section analyzes and attempts to resolve four concerns of
the courts. First, it discusses the argument that defamation is de-
fined as that which injures reputation, such that all claims for in-
jury to reputation must be defamation claims. Second, it discusses
the foreseeability concerns evident in a number of the cases and
argues that foreseeability should be an important part of a court's
analysis. Third, it addresses the concern that plaintiffs suing in
negligence can strategically evade requirements of defamation law,
such as exemptions or statutes of limitation. Finally, it discusses
the views of communication taken by the various courts. It pro-
poses a view of the communication element that preserves the val-
ues of defamation law and addresses the evasion concern, while al-
lowing recovery for worthy claims.
A. Reputational Injuries Result From More than Defamation
In Ross4" and Morrison,47 the courts argued that defamation
was defined by the injury; that is, whenever a plaintiff alleges dam-
age to reputation, her allegations will sound only in defamation. At
"' 422 F Supp at 445.
46 551 P2d 79.
47 227 NE2d 572.
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one time, defamation may have been the only tort to cover damage
to reputation. But damage to reputation did not define the entire
cause of action-other elements were also essential. It would be
anomalous to define the entire cause of action by reference to only
one of its elements. Moreover, recovery for different types of injur-
ies has proliferated in modern tort law.48 Given this expansion, the
fact that courts originally limited recovery for injury to reputation
to defamation is not dispositive.4 e
The simplest and perhaps the best reason to conclude that
defamation alone does not exhaust the routes to recovery for dam-
age to reputation is that most states allow recovery for a number of
other narrowly-defined torts that injure reputation. Specifically,
these states allow recovery for injury to reputation for specific in-
tentional torts, such as malicious prosecution, malicious arrest,
abuse of process, and third party contract interference. 50
In addition, the First Circuit recently permitted an entertainer
to recover for damage to her reputation from a producer who had
broken a contract to allow the entertainer to perform. 51 The court
noted that reputation damages are not ordinarily recoverable in
contract actions because such damages are not easily foreseeable
by the contracting parties. 5 2 In this case, however, the plaintiff's
reputation was at stake because she was a performer whose liveli-
hood rested primarily on her reputation and thus the damage
could have been foreseeable.5
These cases demonstrate that a plaintiff may recover reputa-
tional damages in nondefamation actions-both in tort and in con-
tract. In the face of these established torts, it must be wrong to
maintain that defamation preempts any other action.5 4 These dis-
48 Quinones, 492 F2d at 1278.
49 Id at 1278-79.
50 See, for example, Hamilton, 306 SE2d at 344 (noting that reputational damages may
be recovered for malicious arrest and malicious prosecution); Greives, 550 NE2d at 338 (not-
ing abuse of process, malicious prosecution and third party contractual interference); Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 670(a) (cited in note 9) (recovery for damage to reputation
allowed in action for malicious prosecution).
51 Redgrave v Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F2d 888, 892-94 (1st Cir 1988) (en
banc).
52 Id at 892-93.
Id at 893-94.
Perhaps the courts in Ross and Morrison believed that actions for harm to reputa-
tion brought on these alternative intentional tort theories are actually defamation actions.
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 670, comment a (cited in note 9), describing
malicious prosecution, notes that "[t]he institution of criminal proceedings necessarily car-
ries with it a defamatory accusation of criminal conduct, and the rules that determine the
right to recover for the resulting harm to reputation and distress are similar to those appli-
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crete means of recovery, however, do not in themselves provide
justification for allowing recovery for reputational damage on any
additional theories, particularly on a theory as far-reaching as ordi-
nary negligence 55
B. Resolving the Foreseeability Concern
Several courts have discussed foreseeability concerns in the
negligence context. In Greives v Greenwood and Hamilton v Pow-
ell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, the courts limited the alternative
potential causes of action to intentional torts. The Greives court
cited foreseeability as its motivating concern.
However, in two other cases, courts explicitly ruled out fore-
seeability problems. In Oksenholt, the defendant drug company
failed to comply with federal regulations requiring drug labeling.56
Under state tort law, foreseeability is presumed when a defendant
violates safety regulations.5 7 In Quinones,58 a federal administra-
tive regulation governing the maintenance of personnel records
contemplated a risk to employees' reputations from improper rec-
ord-keeping.59 The court held that a corresponding duty to protect
the reputation comes with foreseeing the potential harm, and al-
lowed the claim in negligence.6
Neither the Oksenholt nor the Quinones courts used the clear
foreseeability of injury in the cases before them to address the
claim that injury to reputation is recoverable only from intentional
torts; that is, to repudiate the Greives framework explicitly, but
intent was absent in both cases and the courts still correctly found
that the injury was foreseeable. As will be argued in Section IV, an
exacting foreseeability standard should be required to recover
reputational damages in a negligence action. However, Oksenholt
and Quinones demonstrate that an intent requirement is not nec-
essary to achieve that foreseeability standard.
cable in actions for defamation." Such statements can be confusing. The malicious prosecu-
tion is itself defamatory, but the action is only "similar to" a defamation action, not the
same as one.
11 See Section IV for an examination of the issues raised by a claim of reputation dam-
ages in an ordinary tort of negligence.
11 See text accompanying notes 27-29.
17 Oksenholt, 656 P2d at 297.
58 See text accompanying notes 41-44.
492 F2d at 1276-77.
60 Id at 1281.
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C. Plaintiffs' Attempts to Avoid the Procedural Requirements of
Defamation
Some plaintiffs have characterized their claims outside of def-
amation to avoid a procedural requirement of defamation law.
While courts have not stated explicitly that this evasion troubles
them, it does seem to play a role in their desire to limit recovery.
This subsection argues that plaintiffs should not be permitted to
avoid these procedural requirements if their claims are otherwise
complete under defamation.
There are several procedural requirements of defamation law
that plaintiffs repeatedly attempt to evade. The Federal Tort
Claims Act, which allows plaintiffs to bring suit against the United
States where sovereign immunity would otherwise prevent it, ex-
empts from its coverage suits based on either libel or slander.6 1 If
the defendant is any department or employee of the United States,
the plaintiff will want to separate the injury from the defendant's
defamatory conduct in order to evade that exemption. The plain-
tiffs in both Jimenez-Nieves and Quinones avoided a defamation
characterization for this reason. In many states, the statute of limi-
tations is shorter for defamation than for an ordinary negligence
action.6 2 In Morrison, the plaintiff brought an action on a negli-
gence theory when the statute of limitations for defamation had
expired. In Ross, the defendant enjoyed a qualified immunity from
defamation suits because of its status as a CPA firm. The plaintiff
would have to have shown actual malice in order to recover, but
could only prove negligence.
Not all of these reasons lead to the conclusion that the defa-
mation remedy is inadequate for a plaintiff with a deserving claim.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, explicitly prevents def-
amation actions in order to protect the speech and deliberation of
government actors.6 3 All other things being equal, courts should
not allow a plaintiff to circumvent this prohibition. Similarly, there
" The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 § 1346 (b) (1988), provides that a plaintiff may
bring a civil suit against the United States. However, certain types of actions are excluded
from the statute. In particular, § 2680(h) provides that § 1346(b) does not apply to libel or
slander claims.
62 See, for example, 12 Pa Stat § 32 (Purdon 1953).
"' The court in Quinones, 492 F2d at 1280, said that the exception to the FTCA for
libel and slander exists to protect speech and to provide a risk-free environment for discus-
sion among government officials. If this is the case, actions that do not implicate speech
should not be subject to the exception. Therefore, my later suggestion that reputational
damages should be recoverable in ordinary negligence only when there is no communication
does not run afoul of the intent of the FTCA.
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is no reason to allow a plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limita-
tions laid down by a state in a claim that otherwise would sound in
defamation.
Nevertheless, where the injury to reputation does not arise
from anything that we can recognize as defamatory conduct, a
plaintiff is without a traditional remedy for the injury. For this
reason, it is important to distinguish between claims that are at-
tempts to mischaracterize defamation, and claims that are not def-
amation. The next section argues that, where a communication is
present, a plaintiff should bring the claim in defamation, even if
the claim ultimately fails because of the ministerial roadblocks dis-
cussed above.
D. The Communication Element
Courts are most concerned with the issue of a communication.
'Courts view the communication question in two distinct ways. One
group-the "definition" courts-assume that if there is a commu-
nication, no other cause of action is allowed. Those courts devote
their prime energy to defining "communication." If that term is
narrowly defined, they will recognize many nondefamation claims,
but if it is broadly defined, they will not. Below, I offer a definition
of communication for courts to use when faced with these cases.
In contrast, another group of courts-represented by Qui-
nones-does not assume that where there is a communication, an
action can only be in defamation. They argue that a plaintiff may
focus on a different aspect of the defendant's conduct, such as the
information-gathering process behind the communication. The
"definition" courts do not explain the assumption that defamation
occupies the entire field of recovery where there is a communica-
tion. In other words, they do not address the Quinones view. This
section argues that the Jimenez-Nieves view, not the Quinones
view, is correct, and provides a rationale for that position.
1. Defining communication.
The "definition" line of cases strives to define communication.
Here, the Comment examines the different courts' views and de-
rives a workable definition from them.
a) The Jimenez-Nieves implicit communication view. In
Jimenez-Nieves,64 the court argued that the communication ele-
84 682 F2d 1.
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ment of defamation can be implicit and not explicit. The court
stated that by dishonoring checks, the Social Security Administra-
tion implicitly communicated defamatory statements to the plain-
tiff's bank and employer. 5 The plaintiff had tried to characterize
the tortious conduct as negligent keypunching, not as communica-
tion, in an effort to circumvent the federal government's immunity
to defamation suits under the FTCA.
Reputation is a relational interest; it is what one person thinks
of another, and it requires a social context for its existence. 6 Thus
an idea must always be conveyed in order for a reputation to be
affected. The Jimenez-Nieves court's "implicit communication"
view effectively extends the definition of communication to encom-
pass anything that could touch a reputation. If we accept that
view, the task is only to find the communication of the idea; by
definition it can be found.
b) The Jimenez-Nieves court's misreading of the Re-
statement. The Jimenez-Nieves court relied on the Restatement
in defining communication. However, the court's reading of the
Restatement stretches its communication definition. The comment
accompanying the Restatement definition of communication says
that an activity, such as shadowing someone, can count as a com-
munication if that activity communicates an idea to a third
party. 8 But the use of this example in the Restatement comment
is somewhat misleading. It obscures the harder question-what is
meant by an "implicit" communication?
The Restatement's example comes from Schultz v Frankfort
Marine Accident & Plate Glass Insurance Co, 69 where the defend-
ant hired a detective to publicly shadow the plaintiff. The court
held that the conduct constituted the communication of an idea.
The court emphasized the "public, notorious, and continued char-
acter of the surveillance" in deciding that it constituted a public
declaration that the plaintiff was suspect and "deserves watch-
ing."'70 The court concluded that "without taking up the question
of secret surveillance, which is not before us, we are impelled to
" Id at 6.
66 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 Cal L
Rev 677, 677 (1986). Post, 74 Cal L Rev at 691-721 (cited in note 4).
47 682 F2d at 6.
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568, comment d (cited in note 9).
" 152 Wis 537, 139 NW 386 (1913).
70 139 NW at 390.
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hold that on this ground a case was made for the jury."' 71 By using
the shadowing example without an explanation of the case, the Re-
statement failed to capture the Schultz court's concern over the
intentional nature of the imputation and communication accompa-
nying that particular case of shadowing. As cited by the Jimenez-
Nieves court, the Restatement parlays a case that emphasizes the
intentional nature of the implicit communication into a general
statement that any behavior that implicitly communicates an idea
is a communication for purposes of defamation law. No other case
law is offered for this broad definition that ignores an intent to
communicate.
c) Intent as the essence of communication. In contrast,
the Restatement elsewhere supports the notion that a communica-
tion must have been intended for it to be a communication at all:
"To be defamatory under the rule stated in this Section, it is not
necessary that the accusation or other statement be by words. It is
enough that the communication is reasonably capable of being un-
derstood as charging something defamatory. '72 Under defamation
doctrine a defendant need not intend her communication to be de-
famatory. But the Restatement requires that she mean to "charge"
something, to communicate something, even if she does not intend
that something to be defamatory. Where shadowing is open and
notorious, it charges something, and it is a communication. But
not all conduct charges something. In Kennedy, for example, 73 it
would be absurd to argue that the anesthesia repair company's
conduct in negligently repairing a machine charged anything. Only
assertive conduct should be considered communication for defa-
mation purposes.
With accident cases, the defendant's conduct causes an event.
The conduct itself does not communicate an idea-people's inter-
pretation of the accident produced by the conduct does. Under the
Restatement definition of defamation, the culpable act itself
"charges" something defamatory. If the culpable conduct produces
some other result, which in turn damages a person's reputation,
the conduct itself should not be defined as communication.
71 Id (emphasis added).
72 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 565, Comment b at 170 (cited in note 9).
71 See text accompanying note 27.
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d) The Jorgensen definition of communication. The
court in Jorgensen, the icy runway case, separated the defendant's
conduct from the resulting accident that communicates an idea:
As we read Jimenez-Nieves, it holds that where the injury is
to reputation and the conduct is the communication of an
idea, the claim sounds in defamation. Thus, it is not simply
the element of injury to reputation that makes conduct sound
in defamation. There also must be a communication, defined
as conduct that brings an idea to the perception of others.
Unlike in Jimenez-Nieves, the defendant's conduct here is
not what conveyed to others the idea that caused harm to
plaintiff's reputations. [Defendant's] failure to clear the run-
way of ice did not bring to the minds of others the concept
that [plaintiffs] were not capable pilots. Rather, [defendant's]
conduct caused a result-the accident-which then could
have caused others to question plaintiffs' skills as pilots....
And without a communication, plaintiffs' claims do not sound
in defamation under the reasoning of Jimenez-Nieves.74
Courts should adopt Jorgensen's reasoning and ask whether a
communication was intended, without regard for whether the
speaker intended that the communication be defamatory. In cases
where the defendant negligently causes an accident like a plane
crash, clearly no communication by word or conduct was in-
tended.75 This test mirrors the intent to communicate element of
the definition of speech discussed in United States v O' Brien76 in
the First Amendment context.
74 Jorgensen, 905 F2d at 520 (citations omitted).
75 In each case where defamation preempted the field, the communication element is
arguably more present than in Jorgensen, Kennedy, and Kleeblatt, where courts allowed a
claim in ordinary negligence. For example, in Jimenez-Nieves, 682 F2d 1, the Social Secu-
rity Administration made a typographical error in a file, stating that the plaintiff's mother
had died a year later than she had. As a result, the SSA told the plaintiff's financial institu-
tions that it was dishonoring his checks. There was arguably communication of the mistaken
information by the defendant. In Ross, 551 P2d 79, the defendant CPA firm (after examin-
ing a union's books) prepared several reports that raised the question of improper use of
funds by union officials. The union sued the CPA firm for negligently preparing its report;
clearly, however, the report communicated defamatory matter.
76 391 US 367 (1968).
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2. The Quinones approach: the plaintiff may elect her
remedies.
The Quinones line of cases does not attemptto define commu-
nication. Instead, these courts hold that a plaintiff may focus on
negligent conduct that is not communicative, even when communi-
cative conduct is also present. In Quinones, the court allowed the
plaintiff to recover for negligent record-keeping in spite of the re-
sulting publication of defamatory matter by the defendant.
Similarly, in Bulkin, the court's decision turned on the plain-
tiff's characterization of the action. The option to choose between
defamation and negligence lay with the plaintiff: "[s]ince the alle-
gations of Bulkin's complaint are weighted toward negligent rec-
ord-keeping, rather than toward wrongful publication of defama-
tory matter, ... we are in accord with the rationale of Quinones
and will apply its holding to our case.''17
The Jorgensen distinction between damaging reputation di-
rectly and causing an accident that causes damage to reputation is
valuable, but the distinction in Quinones and Bulkin between neg-
ligent record-keeping and the defendant's conduct in publishing
the results of the record-keeping is not.18 In Jorgensen, the "com-
munication," insofar as there is one, is implicit in the accident it-
self, and does not come from the defendant directly.79 In the re-
cord-keeping cases, there was a communication by the defendant
that was injurious to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff opted not to
focus on it. The distinction allowed in Quinones and Bulkin could
always apply in cases of negligent (as opposed to malicious) defa-
mation if a complaint is properly characterized.
3. A plaintiff should not be permitted to elect her remedy.
A plaintiff can often recover for injuries under two different
theories, and preemption of one by another is not an issue. For
example, in a traditional defamation action where a defendant de-
fames a plaintiff to the plaintiff's customers, the plaintiff may
bring a claim for defamation or for intentional interference with
contract, and may at her discretion bring one instead of the
" Bulkin, 422 F Supp at 443.
7 Two cases reject the notion that a defamation action can be recast as a negligent
record-keeping action. Hamilton, 306 SE2d 340; Ross, 551 P2d 79.
1 Again, this is how this case differs from Schultz, 139 NW 386, the shadowing case. In
the shadowing case, the shadower was open and notorious about the act, with awareness
that the act would communicate something. In Jorgensen, no communication was intended,
though one occurred.
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other.80 Generally, the only prohibition is against double recovery.
The Quinones and Bulkin cases accord with this general idea.
Courts must decide if there is anything particular to defama-
tion, or to injury to reputation, that would caution against the Qui-
nones approach of allowing recovery under another theory when a
claim can sound in defamation. The justification for limiting the
election of remedies may turn on the rationale behind the unique
standards applied to defamation.
a) Differences between the negligence cases and defa-
mation cases. Defamation traditionally allowed a plaintiff to re-
cover without proof of particular damages once defamatory con-
duct was shown."' Injury to reputation was thought to cause
spiritual damages apart from pecuniary ones, and pecuniary ones,
though real, might be difficult to prove because of remoteness.
Moreover, defamation was a strict liability tort. The plaintiff did
not need to show negligence; the fact that the language was defam-
atory would serve as proof of the defendant's malice. In order to
offset the harshness of the penalty that these rules imposed on the
defendant, the assertion that defamation had occurred was scruti-
nized carefully, with detailed standards arising out of that
scrutiny.82
In the cases examined in this Comment, these concerns are
not at issue. The harshness of strict liability is absent; here, by
hypothesis the defendant has behaved negligently. Plaintiffs do
not benefit from presumed damages. Rather, they must prove
damages as with any action brought on a negligence theory.
b) Reputation claims and concerns of free expression.
In New York Times Co. v Sullivan, the Supreme Court constitu-
tionalized what was always a concern in the defamation bal-
ance-society's interest in free expression. s3 Even where First
1o In fact, it has been held that one remedy will not preempt another under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Rogers u United States, 397 F2d 12, 15 (4th Cir 1968).
81 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9.05(1) at 9-6 to 9-7 (Clark Boardman,
1992).
82 See, for example, Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at § 111 (cited in note 3).
83 376 US 254 (1964). See also Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323 (1974) (public
official may not recover damages for defamation related to official conduct unless actual
malice is proved). For the view that free expression was always a concern in the defamation
balance, see Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at §111 (cited in note 3); Frederick
Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 Cal L Rev 761, 764-65
(1986) (in the 1735 pre-First Amendment trial of Peter Zenger, jury's role in libel cases was
as protector of freedom of speech).
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Amendment rights are not abridged, allowing recovery for commu-
nications has some effect on free expression. Thus where a commu-
nication is even arguably present, a court should not disrupt the
balance of the interest in reputation against the interest in free
expression that has developed in the law of defamation. 4
Without preemption, all defamation plaintiffs suing private in-
dividuals could circumvent defamation where actual malice is ab-
sent but where there is negligence with regard to the falsity of the
publication. This would run afoul of the current purposes behind
the law of defamation. For example, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court developed impor-
tant defamation doctrine concerning recovery by a private person.
The defendant credit reporting agency had published incorrect in-
formation that damaged the plaintiff's reputation for financial in-
tegrity. A high school student employed by the defendant was re-
sponsible for the record-keeping error. If the plaintiff could have
brought a cause of action for negligent record-keeping despite the
presence of a communication, it could have avoided a defamation
action. But significantly, the court in Dun & Bradstreet continued
to voice concerns about restricting expression, though in that case
it found them outweighed by the interest in reputation. Because
defamation law has recognized some defendants' free expression
interests even in cases of speech about private persons, claims
aimed at the negligent act where a communication has also oc-
curred, if allowed outside of defamation, would disrupt the balance
the Supreme Court has deemed important.
Concern for preserving this balance of interests makes inadvis-
able recognition of a claim outside of defamation for damage to
reputation where there is a .communication by the defendant.
While Sullivan and its progeny do not require this outcome, they
express norms that should inform a court's view of the defamation
question. Some courts have expressed vague concern over plain-
tiffs' attempts to circumvent defamation doctrine, but did not ex-
plain why they were so concerned. Concern over interfering with
free expression provides the needed rationale.
8' The court in Quinones, 492 F2d at 1280, noted that the reason Congress excluded
libel and slander from the Federal Tort Claims Act was "that government officials should
not be hampered in their writing and speaking by the possibility that their actions would
give rise to government liability." According to the court, "Congress focused its attention
upon the type of governmental activity that might cause harm [speech], not upon the type
of harm caused [injury to reputation]." Id.
85 472 US 749 (1985).
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However, there are no conceivable countervailing interests when
the defendants have not expressed themselves at all, either implic-
itly or explicitly, but have simply negligently caused an event that
damaged someone else's reputation. The absence of communica-
tion removes the concern that should cause a modern court to
force the claim into defamation law.
Where there is no communication, there is no conduct accu-
rately resembling defamation. If we do not create a duty to behave
with reasonable care toward the reputations of others, we fail to
protect the interest in reputation, though we think it is a valuable
personal asset. On the other hand, where defamatory conduct is at
issue and the only bar to the claim is the statute of limitations or
the Federal Tort Claims Act, a court would disrupt the balance
between the interest in reputation and the protection of expression
struck by current defamation doctrine. There, the defamation ac-
tion is not an inadequate remedy, but the plaintiff's claim does not
meet the requirements of that action.
E. Summary
So far, this Comment has shown that courts presented with
negligence actions approach their cases in a number of ways. Some
categorically exclude actions that are not brought in defamation.
This does not seem to make sense since other actions for inten-
tional torts are widely accepted and since reputation is a recog-
nized interest that ought arguably to be protected from negligent
conduct. Some courts will only grant actions for intentional torts.
Those courts appear to use intent as a proxy for foreseeability.
Though foreseeability problems should preclude many reputation
claims, absence of intent should not categorically mean foreseeabil-
ity cannot be shown. Finally, some courts look for a communica-
tion in the facts of the case, reasoning that if one is present, the
action must be brought in defamation. Those courts disagree on
the proper definition of a communication, but are correct that
claims including a communication should not be cognizable as neg-
ligence actions. Defamation doctrine should be respected for at-
tempting to strike a balance between free expression and the inter-
est in reputation. The proper definition of a communication should
be speech or conduct intended to communicate something, without
regard for whether a defendant intended that the message be
defamatory.
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
F. A Proposed Test
The first step in addressing a case brought on a negligence
theory stems from the Supreme Court's detailed attention to the
protection of expression and to the balance of interests struck by
the law of defamation. Courts faced with a cause of action in ordi-
nary negligence for damage to reputation should ask at the outset
whether there is any communication by the defendant associated
with the harm. If the defendant intended to communicate any-
thing by speech or conduct,-the court should find a communication
for purposes of defamation (without regard to whether the defend-
ant intended the communication to be defamatory) and force the
plaintiff to state the claim in defamation, even if the defendant
was otherwise negligent and even if such procedural roadblocks as
the statute of limitations bar the claim. So, for example, if the
complaint charges the defendant with negligent record-keeping of
any kind, where that negligence led to the communication of de-
famatory matter by the defendant, the plaintiff should be required
to characterize the case as defamation.
Cases still remain, such as Jorgensen and Kennedy,87 where
the defendant has done nothing that remotely resembles an im-
plicit or explicit communication. For these "accident" cases, the
lack of a communication should actually preclude an action in def-
amation, since communication is an element of defamation. Unable
to make out a cause of action in defamation, a plaintiff who at-
tempts to recover for damage to reputation in ordinary negligence
will not enjoy some of the advantages given to plaintiffs in defama-
tion suits. Particularly with regard to proof of injury and a showing
of proximate causation including foreseeability, these claims will
suffer under an ordinary negligence standard. This Comment will
argue that damage to reputation should be recoverable in ordinary
negligence, but only when the injury was clearly foreseeable and
the proof of injury is explicit. This will preclude many damage to
reputation claims.
8 Recall that in Jorgensen, 905 F2d 515, the defendants were responsible for a plane
crash that then harmed plaintiffs' reputations as safe pilots.
" Recall that in Kennedy, 448 NE2d 1332, the defendant was responsible for the death
of the plaintiff's patient when the defendant negligently repaired the plaintiff's anesthesia
machine. The death of the patient then harmed the dentist's reputation as a safe dentist.
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IV. OVERVIEW OF A REPUTATIONAL NEGLIGENCE ACTION
Even when a court decides that defamation is not the only
theory for recovery, it still must decide whether negligence is an
appropriate alternative theory. Courts have given almost no atten-
tion to this question.8 However, the theory of negligence is that
individuals have a duty to act with reasonable care toward the per-
sons and assets of others. The law already recognizes the value of
reputation to an individual; that interest is inadequately protected
against negligent behavior when no communication has occurred
and therefore a defamation cause of action is not available. Ex-
tending the duty of care to reputations flows from this recognition
of reputation as a important interest worthy of protection. The
courts in Jorgensen, Kennedy, Oksenholt, Bulkin, Kleeblatt, and
Quinones all saw the gap in protection afforded to an individual's
reputation when they recognized negligence claims. Where an indi-
vidual can clearly foresee specific harm to another individual's le-
gally recognized property interest, a court can consider assigning
liability to the defendant if fairness requires it.
As argued above, claims allowed on a negligence theory should
be limited to those lacking a communication by the defendant.
However, the following analysis of a negligence action would apply
equally if a court circumvented all discussion of whether to restrict
a plaintiff's ability to elect her remedies. 89
A. Negligence
Typically, there are four requirements for a recovery in tort
under a negligence theory: a legal duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff, breach of the duty, proximate causation, and actual
damages. Proximate causation breaks down further into three
parts: but-for causation, foreseeability, and in many jurisdictions a
requirement that the defendant's conduct be a substantial factor
in bringing about the loss.9"
88 The exception is the Jorgensen court, which decided that a negligence claim was
permissible in general but not on the facts of the case. 905 F2d 515.
89 A court could reason that the interest in reputation is entitled to protection by the
courts, and the method of injury to that reputation is irrelevant. Where it is reasonable to
impose a duty of care to avoid physically injuring others, the extension to reputation is not
incoherent. For the reasons explained in Section III, I believe that this is inappropriate;
however, the following analysis of claims under a negligence standard would apply whether
all claims are allowed or only those in the absence of a communication.
80 See Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 30 (cited in note 3); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 282 (cited in note 9).
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If courts permit claims in negligence, plaintiffs will face two
particular difficulties. First, it will be difficult to establish that the
injury was reasonably foreseeable. Second, it will be difficult to
prove actual damages. One court pointed to both of these difficul-
ties in denying recovery even though it recognized the permissibil-
ity of recovery in theory.9'
Before a court imposes- a duty, it requires foreseeability of
harm to minimize the risk of unlimited liability. Unfortunately, as
courts and commentators have pointed out, foreseeability is often
as much a question of policy as it is one of fact.9 2 However, this
Comment proposes that establishing two elements of foreseeability
in the reputation cases may make it easier for a court to prevent
unbounded liability. First, the injury should be to a particular
foreseeable plaintiff, or a foreseeable class of plaintiffs. Second, the
harm to reputation should be specifically foreseeable, and not a
package of generally foreseeable damages.
This standard borrows from the reasoning of several courts in
cases suggesting standards for recovery for pure economic loss. The
wisdom of these economic loss decisions is that they do not impose
a per se rule of nonrecovery where consequences are clearly fore-
seeable to a defendant, but they are extremely cautious in scruti-
nizing the proximate cause requirement in general and the foresee-
ability requirement in particular.
B. Economic Loss
Two established standards in tort law may illuminate the fore-
seeability factor. First, economic loss to a plaintiff that flows from
property damage or bodily injury is ordinarily recoverable in an
action in tort, regardless of the substantive theory of the underly-
ing claim.93 Second, damage to "pure" economic interests, if recov-
erable at all, is in most jurisdictions only recoverable for inten-
tional torts. 4 The law governing pure economic interests is
informative in examining negligent damage to reputation by anal-
ogy to injury personal interests in the absence of physical injury.
Both damage to reputation and economic loss present the possibil-
"I Jorgensen, 905 F2d at 522-26.
92 See, for example, Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at § 43 (cited in note 3).
Palsgraf v Long Island Rail Co., 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99, 100-01 (1928); Jorgensen, 905 F2d
at 523.
"s Richard A. Epstein, Charles 0. Gregory, and Harry Kalvea, Jr., Cases and Materials
On Torts 1335 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1984).
11 Id at 1183.
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ity of unbridled liability, both implicate difficult to ascertain dam-
ages, and both raise serious foreseeability questions.
Historically, courts have denied recovery of purely economic
losses resulting from negligent acts unaccompanied by physical in-
jury. 5 Courts have argued for a manageable limit on liability with
a physical harm requirement serving as a bright line cutoff.98
Courts usually see the physical consequences of negligence as lim-
ited, while indirect economic injury is unbounded.97 Courts express
concerns about fraudulent claims and the potential for mass litiga-
tion and unlimited liability.9 8 Courts also worry about the possibil-
ity of speculative jury verdicts.99
Several recent cases have extended some protection to pure
economic interests. 100 These courts approach the question with
caution, but do not favor a presumptive denial. They argue that a
defendant should be liable for all the foreseeable consequences of
her negligence, regardless of how the injuries are classified. 1 1
Courts allowing recovery of pure economic losses have stressed
the foreseeability element. 10 2 For example, in J'Aire Corporation v
"I See, for example, Sanco, Inc. v Ford Motor Co., 771 F2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir
1985)(applying Indiana law); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
626 F2d 280, 289 (3d Cir 1980)(applying Illinois law); Superwood Corp. v Siempelkamp
Corp., 311 NW2d 159, 162 (Minn 1981).
o6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (cited in note 9) (positing rule of nonrecovery,
in negligence actions, for purely economic losses absent physical harm); Nebraska Innkeep-
ers, Inc. v Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 NW2d 124, 128-29 (Iowa 1984); Stevenson v
East Ohio Gas Co., 73 NE2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio App 1946). But see Kinsman Transit Com-
pany v Buffalo, 388 F2d 821, 825 n 7 (2d Cir 1968) (explicitly rejecting validity of the nonli-
ability rule and applying flexible standard of recovery).
97 The Federal No. 2, 21 F2d 313, 314 (2d Cir 1927), overruled on other grounds, Black
v Red Star Towing & Transportation Co., 860 F2d 30 (2d Cir 1988); Byrd v English, 117 Ga
191, 43 SE 419, 420-21 (1903); Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v Ross Towboat Co., 280
Mass 282, 182 NE 477, 479 (1932).
" Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F2d at 823; People Express Airlines v Consolidated Rail
Corp., 100 NJ 246, 495 A2d 107, 110 (1985).
" See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 Colum L Rev 917,
944 (1966) (courts express fear of indeterminate liability for merely careless defendant);
Just's Inc. v Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P2d 997, 1005 (1978); Local Joint
Executive Board v Stern, 98 Nev 409, 651 P2d 637, 638 (1982).
100 See, for example, Union Oil Co. v Oppen, 501 F2d 558, 570-71 (9th Cir 1974) (com-
mercial fishermen allowed to sue for recovery from defendant who negligently spilled oil
into commercial waters).
101 See, for example, J'Aire Corp. v Gregory, 24 Cal 3d 799, 598 P2d 60, 64 (1979); H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v Adler, 93 NJ 324, 461 A2d 138, 153 (1983) (shareholders of company can
recover against independent auditors who were negligent in preparing financial statements
upon which shareholders relied).
11 See, for example, Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 73 Iowa L
Rev 1181, 1194-1206 (1988); Comment, Foreseeability of Third-Party Economic Inju-
ries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U Chi L Rev 283, 283-84 (1953).
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Gregory, 10 3 the plaintiff restaurant could not open for business be-
cause the defendant contractor failed to complete work on the
premises owned by a third party with whom defendant had con-
tracted. The court allowed the action, repeatedly stressing the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's economic loss to the defendant.
10 4
C. Foreseeability
Foreseeability motivates the tort cases for both intentional in-
jury to reputation and pure economic loss. In light of the signifi-
cance courts place on foreseeability in these analogous types of
cases, any test for recovery for negligent damage to reputation
should include a strengthened foreseeability requirement. Recov-
ery for damage to reputation raises the same concerns about limit-
less liability for remote consequences that plague courts in eco-
nomic loss cases.
As discussed in Sections II and III of this Comment, foresee-
ability concerns pervade many of the cases on this issue. Some
courts apply a bright line rule, allowing recovery for damage to
reputation only for intentional torts, using intent as a proxy for
foreseeability. One court allowed recovery in theory, but denied it
on the facts of the case because of foreseeability concerns. 105 An-
other court allowed recovery where foreseeability of the injury was
assumed by law for violations of safety regulations. 0 6 Another al-
lowed recovery because the risk of injury had been brought explic-
itly to the defendant's attention in writing, which persuaded the
court that the injury was foreseeable. 7
1. Foreseeable plaintiff.
Courts should require a specifically foreseeable (and identifi-
able) plaintiff or class of plaintiffs, just as with economic loss cases,
in order to prevent disproportionate liability from remote injuries.
Several cases allowing recovery for pure economic loss articulate
this stringent foreseeability requirement. In People Express Air-
lines v Consolidated Rail Corp.,08 the court described a standard
for foreseeability of particular plaintiffs:
103 598 P2d 60.
101 Id at 65.
105 Jorgensen, 905 F2d at 523-24, 527.
106 Oksenholt, 656 P2d at 296-99.
107 Quinones, 492 F2d at 1277.
108 495 A2d 107.
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[a]n identifiable class of plaintiffs must be particularly fore-
seeable in terms of the type of persons or entities comprising
the class, the certainty or predictability of their presence, the
approximate numbers of those in the class, as well as the type
of economic expectations disrupted.'
Similarly, in J'Aire Corp. v Gregory, the court found that the de-
fendant had intended his performance to affect the plaintiff, who
was therefore directly foreseeable."10
So, for example, the anesthesia repair company can anticipate
that if a patient is killed by its anesthesia machine, the reputation
of the dentist who administered the anesthesia will suffer. The re-
pair company might not be expected to foresee, however, that the
reputation of the insurance company that refers patients to that
particular dentist might suffer as well. Although but-for causation
may still be present with respect to the insurance company, that
plaintiff is not readily foreseeable. Similarly, a pharmaceutical cor-
poration can foresee damage to the reputations of physicians pre-
scribing a drug if that drug is mislabelled; however, it may not be
expected to foresee damage to the reputation of referring physi-
cians. These are judgments of degree, not kind, that judges typi-
cally must make in negligence actions. The difference here is only
that courts should be particularly strict in their review of this
question, as many are in economic loss cases.
2. Foreseeable harm.
When a court cannot be reasonably certain that a defendant
could foresee the particular injury to reputation that would result,
it should not allow recovery. This rule is tailored to avoid the dis-
proportionate effect that assessing liability would have in light of
remote foreseeability. Courts can -thereby provide recovery in the
interest of fairness while placing limits on frivolous or speculative
claims.
A runway maintenance crew may be able to foresee various
physical and emotional injuries that could result from the negli-
gent performance of its duties. However, whether it may reasona-
bly contemplate specific damage to the pilots' reputations is a
more difficult question. A court should be careful to ascertain what
exact injuries the defendant could be expected to foresee in analyz-
ing these cases. However, the anesthesia repair company, recogniz-
109 Id (citations omitted).
110 598 P2d at 63-64.
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ing that a negligently repaired anesthesia machine could cause
drastic physical harm, might also directly anticipate the damage
the dentist's reputation would suffer from the death of a patient.
Moreover, where a harm is explicitly stated in advance, as where a
warning of the risk is published in an employee procedures man-
ual, foreseeability is established. The foreseeable harm require-
ment may be difficult to apply because it is another question of.
degree. However, it is preferable to a per se rule against recovery
for damage to reputation where recovery would be in the interest
of fairness in some situations. Courts have been willing to over-
come the difficulty of applying the requirement of foreseeable
harm in economic loss cases in the interest of fairness,111 thus lend-
ing support to the practicality of the solution.
D. Misplaced Blame
One unique element links most of the cases where recovery is
appropriate: the plaintiff is mistakenly held responsible for the de-
fendant's negligent act. The plaintiff's reputation is injured be-
cause people assume that the precise consequence of the defend-
ant's negligent act is the plaintiff's fault. Courts could use this
distinguishing feature in addressing the foreseeability question. A
court would ask whether the defendant could foresee that one con-
sequence of her negligent act would be a mistaken public percep-
tion about fault. So, for example, the dentist is believed to be re-
sponsible for the death of his patient, which was actually the fault
of the anesthesia repair company. This imputation to the dentist is
reasonably foreseeable to the repair company. The prescribing
physician is believed to be responsible for the blinding of his pa-
tient, despite the fact that the pharmaceutical company is in fact
responsible for that injury. And the pilots are believed to be re-
sponsible for the plane crash, though fault has been established in
the maintenance crew. Quinones provides a contrary example. As a
result of negligent record-keeping, the plaintiff's reputation suffers,
but only because a communication results from the record-keeping.
The plaintiff is not suffering because she is thought by others to
have kept the records negligently herself; she is not thought to be a
poor bookkeeper.
In general, the defendant may be asked to foresee that the
person who appears to be the closest to the accident, whose negli-
. J'Aire, 598 P2d at 63; Clay v City of Jersey City, 74 NJ Super 490, 181 A2d 545, 551
(1962), aff'd, 84 NJ Super 9, 200 A2d 787 (1964).
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gence people would first suspect, will suffer reputational damages
as a result of an accident. Therefore, the plaintiff's close proximity
to the accident is a first cut at the foreseeability of harm as well as
the foreseeability of the particular plaintiff.
E. Proof of Damages
In defamation law, a tortured set of rules has developed to
deal with the difficulty of proving damage to reputation.112 The
most obvious mechanism is presumed damages. This device allows
an award of damages without any proof whatsoever of actual injury
or damage. 113 Presumed damages may be available when actual
malice is established, 1 4 or when the case involves a private-figure
plaintiff on a matter of no public concern.1 5 Two other types of
damages exist-special damages, which are pecuniary, and actual
damages, which are non-pecuniary damages supported by evidence.
There is no role for presumed damages in an ordinary negligence
action because proof of damages is a primary element in a negli-
gence claim. In this respect, damages to reputation in ordinary
negligence are more difficult to recover than in an action in defa-
mation. Both special damages and actual damages, however,
should be recoverable in ordinary negligence under the strict fore-
seeability test outlined above.
In defamation, damages to pecuniary interests are called spe-
cial damages. In ordinary negligence, they are called economic loss.
In an ordinary negligence action, they should be subject to the de-
veloping law dealing with economic loss. This Comment's proposed
test is consistent with the law of economic loss-thus its standards
112 Reputation is an odd concept. It could be viewed as the aggregation of a number of
ways a person can suffer harm, though it is sometimes described as a discrete piece of per-
sonal property, itself susceptible to injury. "Actual damages" do not seem present when the
reputation itself is injured, but instead when tangible economic or noneconomic losses flow
from the injury. In other words, in proving actual damage to reputation, a plaintiff finds
herself proving that certain relationships in her life were injured. She is compensated ac-
cording to the harm to each of the relationships. In addition, she is compensated for eco-
nomic losses resulting from the defendant's negligent behavior. In a negligence action, per-
haps the most coherent solution would be to allow recovery for each of the discrete injuries,
without calling it damage to reputation. In effect, the test proposed does that. This would
not apply equally to the law of defamation, since presumed damages are still available in
certain cases.
113 Belli v Orlando Daily Newspapers, 389 F2d 579, 582 (5th Cir 1967); Dalton v
Meister, 52 Wis 2d 173, 188 NW2d 494, 497 (1971); Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of
Damages for Defamation, 12 NC L Rev 120, 127 (1934); David A. Anderson, Reputation,
Compensation, and Proof, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 747, 748 (1984).
"' Gertz, 418 US at 350.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 US at 761-63.
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do not create a conflict." 6 Since actual pecuniary losses must be
shown, there is no opportunity to circumvent the requirement of
showing damages by characterizing economic loss as damage to
reputation.
The standards for proving actual damages in defamation law
are adequate to demonstrate damage to reputation in ordinary
negligence, given a generally recognized legal interest in reputa-
tion.11 7 Actual damages are designed to compensate for injury to
"relational interests." 8 Actual harm need not be pecuniary. Evi-
dence of humiliation or anguish, including the plaintiff's testimony
alone, can be sufficient proof of actual harm." 9 Evidence sufficient
to show these kinds of "actual damages" in a defamation action
under state law should apply to proof of the same damages in ordi-
nary negligence. Standards in a given state for showing emotional
distress should apply when emotional distress is claimed as part of
the actual damage from the injury to reputation. 20 Since evidence
is already required in many defamation cases, proof of damages in
ordinary negligence will only differ from defamation in that pre-
sumed damages will never be available.
CONCLUSION
Modern defamation doctrine reflects a careful balancing of the
interest in reputation and the interest in expression. Accordingly,
when a complaint for damage to reputation involves any communi-
cation by the defendant, the plaintiff should be constrained by the
standards set out in the law of defamation. A court should identify
a communication by asking whether the defendant, by conduct or
speech, intended to communicate something. This inquiry should
not take account of whether the defendant intended that the com-
munication defame the plaintiff. If the complaint focuses on negli-
"I If a court adopted a different standard of recovery than the one proposed in Section
IV, the special damage issue might present a problem. If a court wishes recovery for special
damages to be more readily available than for economic loss, the emerging law with respect
to economic loss will be disrupted; economic loss and special damages are conceptually the
same thing, in different areas, so parity must be maintained.
"' For a description of the different ways of viewing actual damages, see Anderson, 25
Wm & Mary L Rev at 747 (cited in note 113).
118 Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9.06[6] at 9-14 to 9-15 (cited in note 81).
Time, Inc. v Firestone, 424 US 448, 460 (1976).
12 It should be noted, though, that this damage must be for emotional distress due to
injury to the plaintiffs reputation. So, for example, in Kennedy, 448 NE2d at 1332, the
dentist should not be able to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death
of his patient; this is unrelated to his reputational damage and prohibited by the rule which
restricts such recovery to family members only.
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gent conduct, where after the negligent act the defendant commu-
nicated the defamatory information herself, a court should not
allow a negligence claim. Once a court has decided that defamation
does not preclude a negligence action, a plaintiff should be able to
protect her interest in reputation in an ordinary negligence action,
provided she has shown two elements in particular. First, she must
show particular foreseeability-both that the plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs was foreseeable, and that the harm to the plaintiff's repu-
tation was clearly foreseeable. As a proxy for foreseeability, the
court may ask whether the plaintiff suffered injury by being
blamed for the defendant's negligent act. Second, she must prove
her damages to reputation in their entirety, either by showing lost
contracts or job opportunities, or evidence of emotional distress as
a result of reputational damage. This standard should allow for re-
covery in cases where justice warrants it, but should curb unrea-
sonable suits.

